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Abstract
This  research  paper  is  a  summary  of  an  MA  thesis  submitted  to  the  Kimmage
Development Studies Centre, in 2010. The objective was to explore whether geographical
migration has an affect on the cultural identity of Muslim migrants living in Ireland. Set
against the socio-political backdrop of the terrorist attacks of 2001 and the subsequent
“war  on  terror”,  Europe  and  other  parts  of  the  Western  world  have  experienced  a
polarisation of Muslim cultural identity and Euro-Christian cultural identity. Reductive
identities and stereotyping in the past decade have contributed to the growth in perceived
‘terror’ and the ever widening culture gap.  
With  an interest  in  interculturalism,  my aim was to  assess  whether  migration  affects
change on Muslim cultural identity and if it contributes to the perpetuation of cultural
‘Othering’. I conducted twelve semi-structured interviews with Muslim migrants in the
Dublin area and an additional eight questionnaires. 
Findings from my primary research suggested the experience of being a cultural ‘Other’ 
is significant. It also suggested that religious identity in a migrant context may serve the 
dual purpose of both ‘spiritual guide’ and as a means of ‘self-recognition’. Finally, my 
research indicated that the Muslim migrant experience in Ireland is significantly shaped 
by the multi-ethnic nature of this community. 
Keywords:        'Muslims',  'Migrants', 'Migration',  'Culture', 'Cultural Identity', 
'Interculturalism'
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1. Introduction and Outline
In my research I analysed the affects of geographical displacement on the cultural identity
of Muslim migrants living in Ireland, and assessed, whether migration shapes Muslim
cultural identity? Central to my research was the construct of the ‘Other’ and how in a
Western, “post 9/11”, security conscious society, Muslims frequently are cast in the role
of ‘other’ or ‘outsider’. 
Living  close  to  the  distinctly  multi-ethnic  Sunni  Mosque on Dublin’s South Circular
Road,  I  am aware of the growing Muslim community.   However there is  an almost
complete disconnect between the non-Muslim and Muslim communities. It is what Wood
and Landry call “a casual routine of avoidance” (2008, p.319). 
At an international  level,  media-led debate continues  to focus on right  wing Political
Islam. This gives rise to what Brian Murphy calls  “the politics of fear” (2007, p.50).
Anti-immigration and right wing sentiment have gained momentum in the past decade
and  we  are  witnessing  a  growing  political  antipathy  towards  Muslim  migrants  in
particular. On the 10th of June 2010, Geert Wilders and the anti-Islamic Party for Freedom
in  the  Netherlands  came  third  in  the  general  election  securing  1.5  million  votes.
According  to  journalist  Vanessa  Mock  of  The  Independent  World, his  remarks  were
“more security, less crime, less immigration, less Islam – that is what the Netherlands has
chosen" (2010).1 
1.2. Concepts Outlined
The three concepts central to my research are,
 (i) Migration (ii) Cultural identity and (iii) the ‘Other’.
1 Following the 2014 European elections, Wilder's Party for Freedom (PVV) represents the 4th largest 
party in the Netherlands, securing 12.2% of the vote. While this represents a decline in support since 
2010, he continues to garner significant public support for his party.
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2. Concept 1: Migration
The issues specific to Irish immigration may be different to the current debates taking
place  within  other  European  countries,  on  account  of  Ireland’s relative  inexperience,
emphasis on first generation migrants and the eclectic ethnic mix of migrants in Ireland.
However there is certainly a lot to be learned from the experience had in other territories.
It is for this reason I will look at the migration policies and practice exercised by two
European countries - the United Kingdom and France, both with a significant Muslim
population and a long history of immigration.
2.1. Multiculturalism in the United Kingdom
Multiculturalism  as  an  immigration  model  has  become  the  widely  accepted  goal  for
British society. It was founded on the liberal thinking of Labour Home Secretary Roy
Jenkins  in  the  1960’s.  He said  it  is  not  “a  flattening  process  of  uniformity”  but  the
promotion  of  “cultural  diversity  and  mutual  tolerance”  quoted  in  Mac  Éinrí  (2007,
p.223). Multiculturalism strives to recognise and respect cultural difference and promote
tolerance and is strongly associated with the principles of cultural relativism or cultural
particularism. Schnapper describes it by saying “multiculturalism finds its origins in a
society  that  sees  itself  made  up of  groups  and  communities  rather  than  individuals”
(1994, p.27).
2.1.1. Criticisms of Multiculturalism
Reification of Culture
Mac Éinrí says while Britain attempted to address forms of racism, it did this within a
framework which was “based on the reification of ethnic difference” (2007, p.223). The
reifying  of  culture  involves  viewing  culture  as  something  absolute  and  ultimately
unchanging. It has a limited view of culture as existing within the ‘overt realm’ – all that
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is seen, said and done. As opposed to acknowledging the ‘covert realm’ - the intangible
aspects of culture that informs our values, beliefs and fears.  
Multiculturalism and Stereotyping
Mulhern  talks about the “monocultural face of multiculturalism” (2009, p.43). He argues
that  the  “multiculturalist  appeal  to  diversity  has  the  paradoxical  effect  of  promoting
customary  stereotypes  even  if  it  deplores  their  negative  effects”  (2009,  p.42).  A
multiculturalist  tendency assumes that a given group have only  one particular way of
behaving.  Cagler explains that difficulties arise when multiculturalism aims to secure the
survival  of  cultural  communities  in  a  migrant  context,  as  it  “implies  an
institutionalization of culture in the public sphere, a freezing of cultural difference and a
reifying of cultural communities” (1997, p.179).  Therefore, the experience of migration
for  the  migrant  is  an  encounter  with  the  stereotyped  ‘self’  as  projected  by  the  host
community. As Taylor says “our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence,
often by the misrecognition of others” (1994, p.25). While multiculturalism does aim to
‘recognise’ culture, it cannot help but to reduce and fix cultural difference; and ultimately
give rise to stereotyping.
Power and Inequality
Another  criticism  of  multiculturalism  is  the  way  in  which  it  negotiates  power  and
exercises equality. In support of the multicultural approach to equality Tariq Modood says
“a new concept of equality [is] one in which the issues of ‘representation’ have not just to
do with numbers in various categories of people in certain jobs or positions of power, but
with  ‘representation’  as  the  public  imagining  of  groups  as  groups”  (2002,  p.117).
Mulhern however describes ‘diversity’ and an emphasis on cultural ‘difference’ as being
“a  historically  constituted  relation  of  organised  inequality,  dominations  and
subordination” (2009, p.41). Critical thinkers on diversity and multiculturalism suggest
that  the  emphasis  on  ‘difference’  only  serves  to  distinguish  between  majority  and
minority  communities,  with  the  power  always  resting  with  the  hegemonic  majority.
Lentin argues that “multiculturalist and interculturalist politics are anchored in a liberal
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politics of recognition and difference…and is failing to intervene in the uneasy interface
of minority and majority power relations” (2001, p.3).
2.2. Assimilation and the French Model
French notions of assimilation draw heavily on the principles of cultural universalism. It
adopts a long term approach, where migrants are incorporated into the receiving society.
However  unlike  Britain,  it  does  not  publicly  support  the  recognition  of  cultural
difference. French assimilation means that citizenship is based on “a contract between the
individual and the state” (Mac Éinrí 2007, p.219) that, “the policy of integration at an
individual not collective or ‘community’ level remains an intrinsic part of the Republican
compact” (Schnapper 1994, p.151).  
2.2.1. Criticisms of French Assimilation
Public Sphere / Private Sphere
In  2004 a  law was  passed  concerned  with  the  separation  of  church  and state  which
banned  the  “conspicuous”  wearing  of  religious  symbols  in  all  state  schools.  This
legislation was replaced with new legislation on the 13th July 2010 which introduced a
complete  ban of the Burqa and Niqab in all  public  places.  France’s Lower House of
Parliament voted in favour of the ban with a majority of 335 votes to 1. One critic of the
privatisation  of  religious  expression  is  Hobsbawm.  He  argues  that  “religion  as  the
ritualization of life…as a common bond of communities – is so widespread throughout
history  that  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  regard  it  as  a  superficial  phenomenon,  or  one
destined  to  disappear”  (2010,  p.144). A truly  secular  state  in  my  mind,  is  one  that
exercises  tolerance  and  supports  a  multiplicity  in  faiths,  not  one  that  criminalizes
individual practice.
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Power
The assimilationist model once again raises the issue of power. Castles says that many
immigrants in France “are no longer willing to accept assimilation when it brings neither
social  equality  nor  protection  from  racism”  (2000,  p.138).   There  is  an  inherent
contradiction at the heart of French assimilation, in that it promises individual equality
but continues to allow exclusion, ghettoisation and racism.
Universalism as Reified Culture
There is also the issue that no culture or identity is ever truly ‘universal’. The universal
“is  no more than a particular  which at  some moment has become dominant” (Laclau
1996, p.50). Laclau goes on to argue that the universal cannot exist without the particular
and this is the foundation of democracy. He explains,  “if democracy is possible,  it  is
because the universal has no necessary body and no necessary content; different groups
instead, compete among themselves to temporarily give their particularism a function of
universal  representation”  (1996,  p.57).  And French republican  secularism is  arguably
nothing more than a particularism with a universal representation.  While particularism
risks reifying culture, universalism denigrates difference on a global level, and that in
itself is an expression of reified culture. Wood and Landry in their critique say “the West
too must face up to the paradox that its reverence for its own liberal secularism born out
of the Enlightenment, can breed its own fundamentalism” (2008, p.10).
2.3. A Model for Ireland 
The debate around inward migration and integration of Muslims and other migrants is
relatively new to Irish society.  This allows us the distinct advantage to learn from the
experiences and mistakes made in other territories. Do we for example propose to adopt
an assimilationist perspective that is typical of France? Or would Ireland be better suited
to the multicultural perspective long associated with Britain? What is clear though is that
we have to revaluate the makeup of Irish society and what constitutes the cultural “we”.
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Mac Éinrí says that not only is the debate in its infancy, but that the country is adopting
“an unthinking and untheorised version of the UK model” (2007, p.216). 
2.4. Concept 2: Cultural Identity
 
Cultural  identity  can  be  defined  in  many  different  terms;  ethnicity,  faith,  gender,
profession, nationality and in many cases as being that which we are not. Sen says “a
person has  to  decide  on the relative  importance  to attach  to  the respective  identities,
which will depend on the exact context” (2006, p.19), i.e. ‘where’ you are, and ‘when’
you are. Two prominent markers of cultural identity and difference are (i) religion and (ii)
nation. Firstly I will discuss religion as a marker of cultural identity with attention to its
relevance to Muslim migrants.
2.4.1. Religion as a Marker of Cultural Difference
Religion as a marker of cultural difference is communicated through ritual, symbolism
and shared beliefs. Mulhern says “customary difference is most strongly confirmed in the
plane  of  religion,  whether  as  doctrine,  as  worship,  as  spiritual  observance  or  as
sanctioned behaviour” (2009, p.42).
2.4.1.1. Islam: Heterogeneous or Homogeneous
Ernest  Gellner  in  his  book  Nationalism says  the  “the  roots  of  Islam  are  in  the
transcendent and not in the soil” (1997, p.84) and also that “Islam appears capable of
competing  successfully  with nationalism,  whether  or not it  is  in  control  of the state”
(1997, p.89). I think the temptation is to qualify Islam as occupying a singular cultural
identity, while it is probably more accurate to say, within Islam “there are several cultures
sharing  one  religion”  while  in  secular  states  “there  are  several  religions  within  one
culture” (Bowie 2006, p.24). 
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Sen (2006) in  his  book  Identity  and Violence warns  against  the  dangers  of  reducing
Muslim identity to the lowest common denominator and that “being a Muslim is not an
overarching identity that determines everything a person believes” (2006, p.65).  Sen’s
criticism is not purely one of a descriptive mistake, but says that denying Muslims plural
identities “is significant in the battle against the politicization of religion” (2006, p.71)
and “has serious implications for policies for peace in the precarious world we live in”
(2006,  p.75).  One  of  the  reasons  why  Muslim  cultural  identity  is  homogenized  and
stereotyped  in  the  minds  of  Western  secular  society  is  because  Islam is  believed  to
challenge the values of Western states. Schnapper says “the anxiety and opposition to the
presence of Muslims are felt about their commitment to modern democratic societies and
about  their  ability  to  integrate  into  European  nations”  because  “the  practice  of  [the
Muslim] religion goes beyond the strictly religious domain” (1994, p.148).   
2.4.2. ‘Nation’ as a Marker of Cultural Difference
What is a Nation?
The most obvious difference between ‘religious identity’ and ‘national identity’ is one of
imagined or real borders, even though both share what Anderson calls the creation of
“imagined communities” (1983, p.15). 
The nation as something “imagined” is a thesis most commonly associated with Benedict
Anderson (1983) and his book Imagined Communities - Reflections on the Origins and
Spread of Nationalism. In it he explores the idea of the nation as an imagined political
community and as “being both inherently limited and sovereign” (1983, p.15). As being
defined not only by geographical boundaries but also by social boundaries. He says it is
imagined because “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of
their fellow members, meet them or even hear of them, yet in the mind of each lives the
image of their communion” (ibid.). The imagined community offers what Anderson calls
“fraternity” and “comradeship” (1983, p.16). It offers more than anything else a sense of
belonging in the same way that religion engenders a sense of belonging or membership. 
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Theorists like Gellner (1997) propose that Islam signifies an “imagined community” on
account of shared religious belonging. 
2.4.2.1. Transmission of the Imagined Nation
If  the  strength  of  national  identity  depends  on  something  as  ephemeral  as  the
‘imagination’,  how is  a sense of real  belonging sustained? Ultimately it  is  done with
symbols  –  through  them we recognise  ourselves,  with  what  Anderson calls  “cultural
artifacts” (1983, p.13). This is what in many societies is called ‘culture’ or ‘heritage’.
Gellner  in  his  book  Nationalism says  that  “culture  is  the perpetuated  and sometimes
transformed and manipulated,  bank of acquired traits” (1997, p.3). Acquired traits are
represented in two ways, (i) the overt or tangible realm – with flags, symbols, anthems
and  traditions  and  (ii)  the  covert  or  intangible  realm  –  values,  norms,  beliefs,  and
prejudices. But it is through “acquired traits” that a united and homogenous community is
created and sustained. Nowhere else is religious identity more similar to national identity
than in its use of “acquired traits”. That is, the invention and transmission of identity
through symbols, traditions and beliefs.
Hobsbawm says that the invention of tradition will “occur more frequently when a rapid
transformation  of  society  weakens  or  destroys  the  social  patterns  for  which  ‘old’
traditions  had been designed” (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983, p.4) -  When we fail  to
‘recognise’ ourselves, “acquired traits” and symbols take on greater importance.  This is
certainly relevant to the controversial banning and policing of religious dress in France
and the debate around permitted and forbidden symbols.
2.5. Concept 3: The ‘Other’
The role  of  ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ is  part  of  the ancient  human narrative.  Richard
Kearney in his book  Strangers, Gods and Monsters says the human experience and most
ideas of identity “have been constructed in relation to some notion of alterity…where we
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discriminate against the Other in favour of the Same” (2003, p.66). In essence there is no
‘us’ if there is no ‘them’. 
 There are two primary reasons why society constructs the ‘Other’.
(i) As an aid to the construction of the ‘self’.
(ii) As a social scapegoat.
Hobsbawm  says  “collective  identities  are  defined  negatively”  (1996,  p.40).  It  is  a
defining process that belongs to a world of binary opposites. The anatomy of the ‘Other’
belongs to a social taxonomy that alters according to existing requirements. As Norval
points out,  “there is no ‘givenness’ or ‘naturalness’ to forms of identification” (1996,
p.68), there is only an ‘us’ that exist in a ‘now’ that require an opposing ‘them’. 
It is in opposition to the ‘Other’ that a “horizontal comradeship” is formed, as discussed
in Anderson’s Imagined Communities. He says “it is this fraternity that makes it possible,
over the past two centuries for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willing
to die for such limited imaginings” (1983, p.16). A dynamic of ‘us’ against ‘them’ creates
cohesion and a bond amongst ‘us’ that is otherwise difficult to generate. As Huntington
says in The Clash of Civilisations, “we know who we are only when we know who we
are not, and definitely when we know who we are against” (1996, p.20).  For example
looking at  the categories  of  ‘East’ and ‘West’,  Anceschi  et  al.  would argue that  “the
concept of the ‘West’ as civilisational category has arguably been strengthened by the
reappearance of a certain discourse on Islam” (2009, p.1). This is done Anceschi et al.
say, by presenting Islam as a “transnational political phenomenon” (2009, p.506). 
The use of the ‘Other’ to create an idea of a united ‘we’ is not uncommon. Take Muslim
migrants in France for instance, Malik argues that “the transformation of Islam in the
French political imagination in the eighties has less to do with the nature of Islam than
with  problems of  French decline…and  the  fragmentation  of  national  identity”  (1996,
p.195). Secular, individualistic societies like France and also Ireland, are experiencing a
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deviation  from the traditional  “imagined community”.  Paradoxically, it  is  through the
emergence  of  a  threatening  ‘other’ that  the  “horizontal  comradeship”  is  realigned.  It
offers a nation the opportunity to re-state its shared values and boundaries.
2.5.1. The ‘Other’ as Scapegoat
Michael Welch (2006) in his book Scapegoats of September 11th describes the process of
‘scapegoating’ as “a social psychological defence mechanism against confronting the real
source of the frustration…it provides emotional relief for people racked with fear and
anxiety” (2006, p.4).  In a “post-9/11” globalised world, the enemy to Western democracy
and capitalism is no longer Communism from the East,  but Islamic ‘fundamentalism’
from the Arab world. The terror mindset has garnered considerable currency in the world
of politics and the Muslim migrant I believe, has provided many European countries with
a proficient scapegoat. We only have to look at the anti-Islamic slogans of right wing
politicians such as Geert Wilders of the Netherlands.
What is ‘scapegoating’? Bo Petersson describes it as “the process by which one or several
persons are ascribed the blame for the incidence of bad luck, diseases, misfortunes and
sins” (2009, p.461). It also as Kearney points out, “furnishes communities with a binding
identity”  (2003,  p.26).  Scapegoating  generally  occurs  for  two  main  reasons,  (i)  as  a
response  to  insurmountable  or  disorientating  fear  (ii)  as  a  survival  mechanism when
resources or safety is under threat.
Referring  to  the  headscarf  controversy  in  France,  Emmanual  Terray  (2004,  p.118)
explains that,
When a community fails to find within itself the means or energy to deal with a
problem that challenges, if not its existence, then at least its way of being and
self-image…it will substitute a fictional problem which can be mediated purely
through words and symbols, for the real one that it finds insurmountable.
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Terray argues that racial exclusion and isolation are the real problems in France and that
the headscarf issue has fulfilled the role of “fictive problem” (2004, p.121). It is pertinent
to  ask,  how will  the  subsequent  2010 ban  on the  Hijab  and Niqab  address  the  real
problems French society faces with racial exclusion and inequality?
2.5.2. Stereotypes
Hall presents the function of stereotyping as being one of imposing order on a seemingly
chaotic world, “stereotypes arise when self-integration is threatened. They are therefore
part  of  our  way of  dealing  with  the  instabilities  of  our  perception  of  the  world…to
preserve our illusion of control over the self and the world” (1997, p.285).  It is then not
surprising that supposed security threats and increased immigration give rise to a greater
inclination to stereotyping. In essence, stereotyping is about ascribing ‘difference’ in the
pursuit of meaning and control. 
2.6. Conclusions of Literature Review
The three central themes (i) migration (ii) cultural identity and (iii) the construction 
of the ‘Other’ have been explored in general terms in this section and inform my primary
research with Muslim migrants in Ireland. The international perspective on each of the
themes inform the breadth of my enquiry. The main points of enquiry as informed by this
review of literature are:
• What is the translocational migration experience of Muslim migrants in Ireland? 
• To what extent is Muslim ‘cultural identity’ shaped or changed by the migrant
experience? 
• Is  there  an  experience  amongst  Muslim  migrants  in  Ireland  of  being  cast  as
cultural ‘Other’?
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3. Research Methods and Approach to Research 
In my research I aimed to foster a level of understanding and insight into the main issues
that were of concern to Muslim migrants in the area of cultural identity and notions of
belonging.  I  aimed  to  achieve  this  through  qualitative,  inductive  analysis  with  an
interpretivistic  viewpoint.  This  research  is  deductive  in  so  far  as  the  purpose  of  the
research  in  not  to  articulate  a  pre-formed  proof,  but  to  address  relevant  unanswered
questions.
 
Through non-probability sampling, I conducted 12 semi structured interviews in August
of  2010  with  migrants  from the  Muslim  community  -  7  men  and  5  women.  These
represented  the  ethnic  diversity  of  this  community  coming  from Kyrgyzstan,  Libya,
Algeria, Latvia, Brunai, Pakistan Morocco, The Gambia and India. I also conducted a
questionnaire with a Dublin based Muslim community from Pakistan of approximately 8
male contributors. Ages of all contributors ranged from early 20s to late 50’s.
4. Findings and Analysis
The findings  in  this  research paper  represent  only a sample of the findings from the
complete thesis.
4.1. Migration - Immigration Policy and Integration
On a policy level Ireland appears to position itself somewhere between the Gasterbeiter
guest worker model associated with Germany, and the non-invasive laissez faire approach
associated with Britain. Most contributors favoured the Irish system as compared to other
European countries like the UK or France.  However it  should be noted,  the negative
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association with other European immigration policies and Ireland’s relative success, may
reflect nothing more than other territories abject failure. As one man said to me “this may
come as a surprise, but Irish people are actually the least racist people in Europe!” We
may be viewed as one of the least racist countries in Europe but that does not mean we do
not have an issue with racism. 
A 2009 OECD report says “the German experience is a lesson in the law of unintended
consequences” (Keely, p.27). Similarly, Irish immigration policy lays emphasis on the
first generation migrant, even though it is frequently amongst the second generation that
the experience of exclusion and racism is most pronounced. And so while a number of
my  research  contributors  favoured  Irish  immigration  policy  over  British  and  French
policy, will this continue to be the view of 2nd generation Muslim migrants in Ireland? 
4.2. Cultural Identity - Raising Children
Wright says, culture is not a ‘thing’ it is a “political process” (1998, p.13). And nowhere
is  the  ‘process’  of  culture  more  evident  than  in  its  transition  from  generation  to
generation. It reinforces who you are and what you hope to become. Child rearing in a
migrant context addresses the controversial issues of (i) cultural particularism – retaining
what is unique and distinct about your culture and (ii) cultural universalism – introducing
cultural ‘norms’ that relate to ‘common’ cultural values or values of the host society.
Mac Éinrí argues, cultural particularism is “based on the reification of ethnic difference”
(2007,  p.223).   One  contributor,  a  young mother,  told  me  “you  have  to  teach  them
[children] that you are different…you are in this country but you don’t forget who you
are”.  However  culture  as  ‘lived’,  is  never  fixed.  One father  who has  brought  up his
children in Ireland talks about the challenges of intergenerational  cultural  differences.
“The parents are still rooted in the culture and the children want out of the culture…it
can be devastating and cause a split in families”. It represents a cultural power dynamic
of majority and minority, of defining and redefining what culture is. The experience of
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